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Abstract
This study uses Hoi%tede’staxonomy of work-refated mtionaf cultural dimensions to analyze preferences for
specitic management controfs at the interface between the organization and the external labor markeL Four
experiments were conducted with samples of last-semester Japanese and U.S. MBA students. Most of the
resufts did not provide support fir the four hypotheses. These tirtdingsare used as the basis for suggesting
potentiat directions for fhture empiricat refinements and theory construction.
With the accelerating globalization of business,
the extent to which any particular management
control can be effectively used in different
countries has become an increasingly important
issue. This issue has arisen because much
evidence exists that people from different
countries have diverse work-related national
cultures (Adler et al, 1986; Hofktede, 1980,
199 1; Kagitcibasi & Berry, 1989; Laurent, 1983),
and that people of di.tTerent cultural origins have
ditTerent attitudes toward, or reactions to,
the same management controls (Bimberg &
Snodgrass, 1988; Chow et al., 199 lb; Daley et
a~, 1985; Harrison, 1992; Horovitz, 1980;
Kreder & Zeller, 1988). These cultural differ-
ences suggest that management controls which
are effective in one country may be ineffective,
or even dysfunctional, in another. Such cross-
cultura.1 dtierences can arise both internally
(e.g. by affecting the work-related behavior of
a given set of employees) and at the interface
between the organization and the external labor
market (e.g. attracting and retaining employees ).
A large number of empirical studies have
examined relationships between mtional culture
and various aspects of management (e.g. long-
range planning, strategic decision making).
However, only a few have specifically focused
on the relation between national culture and
employees’ attitudes toward, or reactions to,
“ The authors are indebted to Takayuki Asada (Tsukuba University) for his help in data collection, and to Jake Birnber&
Steve Kachelmeier, ,MarkYoung and two anonymous reviewers for providing us with many helpfid comments. h earlier
version of this paper was presented at the 1992 University of New South Wafes Management Accounting Research
Conference.
381
I
384 CHEE W. CHOW et aL
basis for predicting dilTerences between Japanese
and U.S. nationals’ preferences for management
controls.
Prior to developing such predictions, three
potential concerns regarding Hofstede’s cultural
dimensions should be addressed. First, since
Hofstede’s cultural scores were obtained in the
1970s, their continued applicability toJapan and
the U.S. in the 1990s may be open to question.
Second, most of Hofktede’s subjects were
employed by the same firm, and his culture
scores may have been confounded by firm-
specific factors, such as industry, size and
corporate culture. Third, Hofstede’s definition
of the cultural dimensions may be biased
because they are a product of Western culture
and thinking.
While it may not be possible to prove
conclusively the validity of Hof%tede’s taxonomy,
there is evidence to suggest its applicability to the
current study. Specifically relating to Hof%tede’s
cultural dimensions, mvo studies have collected
more recent data horn more diverse subjects
and using difTerent instruments than that of
Hofstede ( 1980). In a study of subjects horn
nine Asian and Pacilic countries, Ng et aL ( 1982)
obtained culture measures using an instrument
(the Rokeach Value Survey) designed for assess-
ing values in the U.S. For the six countries in
their sample which overlapped those of Hofktede
(1980), four discriminant function scores were
obtained. Three of these scores were signifi-
cantly correlated with Hofstede’s four cultural
dimensions (Ho!%tede & Bond, 1984). Another
validation of Hofitede’s taxonomy used an
instrument which was based on Asian culture
and thinking (Chinese Culture Comection,
1987). This instrument was developed by a
sequential process of analyzing the Asian litera-
ture on work and culture, and surveying
respected researchers on Asian culture. Data
then were collected from university students
from 22 countries (both Asian and Western)
who had work experience. These data yielded
a four-dimensional model in which three dimen-
sions significantly correlated with three of
Hofstede’s dimensions: individualism, power
distance, and masculinity.
Other studies have reported findings which
corroborated Hofstede’s taxonomy in the case
of individualism w collectivism. Students of
Japanese culture have emphasized Japanese
individuals’ tendency to place the interests
of the collective over those of the self ( Befu,
1980; Kamata, 1982; Morsbach, 1980; Ouchi,
198 1; Reischauer, 1977; Smith, 1983). Despite
Japan’s tremendous economic and technological
advances in recent years, it has exhibited no
discernible change in such basic values (Trom-
msdorfl, 1983, 1985). In contrast to the
Japanese’ collectivistic culture, the individual-
istic motive has been identified as the corne-
rstone of U.S. world view and management
theories (Harris & Moran, 1987; Locke &
Latham, 1984; Mitchell, 1974; Sampson, 1977;
Spence, 1985).
Finally, Ronen & Shenkar ( 1985 ) have reviewed
eight studies which had used attitudinal data to
cluster countries (including Hofitede, 1980, and
a related, earlier work, Hofstede, 1976 ). Substan-
tial overlap was found to exist between Ho!%tede’s
clusters and those of the other studies.
Related prior studies
Four prior empirical studies on management
controls are of particular relevance to this study.
All four have examined national differences in
attitudes toward, or reactions to, management
controls. Two of these have involved a com-
parison between Japan and the U.S.
Daley et aL (1985) surveyed Japanese and
U.S. divisional managers and corporate con-
trollers in the 500 largest corporations in each
country. For each type of employee, the
Japanese and U.S. respondents’ attitudes toward
35 aspects of a management control system
were obtained. Comparing the attitudes of the
Japanese and U.S. respondents towards these 35
aspects, 27 (25) of the controllers’ (managers’)
responses were statistically significantly difltient.
Of particular relevance to this study, Daley et
al (1985) found that the U.S. respondents
agreed more with the use of controllability
filters, purchase autonomy (a type of decentrali-
zation), slack in budgets (standard dilliculty),
expressing budget goals in monetary terms, top-
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down (as opposed to participatively set ) budgets,
and using budgets to evaluate performance. The
Japanese respondents, however, agreed more
with using budgets to communicate goals,
and less with budget-contingent compensation.
Overall, Daley et al. ( 1985) have increased the
level of understanding about Japanese and U.S.
managers’ attitudes toward the components of
a management control system. However, since
this study lacked an explicit theoretical cultural
framework and its results were largely incon-
sistent with expectations (findings for seven of
the ten stated directional expectations were
contrary to predictions), it provides no clear
basis for developing expectations in the current
study.
In contrast, Birnberg & Snodgrass ( 1988)
focused on three functions of a management
control system (monitoring, evaluating, reward-
ing) and based their empirical analysis on a
variety of anthropological and sociological
studies. Data were collected from 1051 managers
and workers in 22 large Japanese and U.S. firms.
The results indicated that the Japanese managers
and workers had more similar values about
monitoring and evaluating than did the U.S.
managers and workers. However, when con-
sidering rewarding, the U.S. respondents were
more homogeneous than the Japanese. Birnberg
& Snodgrass ( 1988) also found that the Japanese
firms had more implicit or informal control
systems while the U.S. fums had more explicit
or formal control systems. Finally, the Japanese
respondents were found to view their control
systems as being more explicit in disseminating
information, while the U.S. respondents saw
their control systems as being more explicit in
de!ining roles. For the purposes of the current
study, while the Birnberg & Snodgrass (1988)
results are driven by theory, their focus on
aggregated functions of a control system does
not provide much guidance for examining
specific control system components.
Chow et aL ( 1991 b) applied HofStede’s
( 1980) taxonomy of national culture to an
examination of relationships between compon-
ents of control systems and national culture.
Their laboratory experiment used student sub-
jects from Singapore and the U.S. to test how
individualism interacts with two types of control
system interdependence (work flow and pay )
to atlect performance. Overall, the results
supported the notion that national culture and
management controls have independent, not
interactive, effec~ on performance. While this
finding is of interest, a limitation of the Chow
et al. ( 1991 b ) study is that it only examined
two control system components.
Finally, Harrison (1992) used Hofktede’s ( 1980)
taxonomy to study the moderating effects
of participative budgeting on the relationship
between performance evaluation style and job
related tension and job satisfiwtion. He argued
that participation is ne~tively related to power
distance and individualism. Since Hol%tede
( 1980, 1983a) reports that most countries have
either high power distance and low individual-
ism or low power distance and high individual-
ism, Harrison hypothesized that participation
would have the same moderating effect on
the relationship between performance evalua-
tion style and job-related tension and job
satisfaction for both combinations (high-low
and low-high ) of these cultural dimensions.
Using data obtained tiom managers fkom Australia
(low power distance and high individualism)
and Singapore (high power distance and low
individualism ), Harrison found that, as predicted,
national culture did not tiect the moder-
ating effect of participative budgeting. Hence,
Harrison’s study only provides indirect evidence
on the effects of national culture, in addition to
being limited to one component of the manage-
ment control system.
h summary, these prior studies have increased
the level of understanding about national
ditlerences relating to management controls,
but they offer limited guidance for the develop-
ment of cross-cultural predictions at the level
of specific controls.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
This section is organized into three parts. The
first briefly describes the 11 components of a
J
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management control system which are included
in this study. The second discusses three
complications in analyzing the effects of national
culture on preferences for these components.
It also develops predictions of differences
between Japanese and U.S. nationals’ prefer-
ences for these components. The third part
presents four hypotheses which are empirically
tested in this study.
Components of a management contmt system
A management control system has several
major functions, including organizing, planning,
evaluating and rewarding (Birnberg & Snodgrass,
1988; Flamholtz et al, 1985; Otley, 1980;
Rockrtess & Shields, 1984, 1988). In turn, each
of these functions encompasses numerous com-
ponents. Table 1 lists 11 components of a
management control system which span these
four major fhnctions. These components have
been shown by prior research (see below)
to affect beliefk about, or behavioral reac-
tions to, management controls. These 11 com-
ponents are the focus of this study; they are
organized by function and briefly described
below.~
TABLE 1. Control system and components
Function Components
Organizing Environmental uncertainty
Hierarchy height
Centralization
Horizontal interdependency
Formal rules
Planning Topdown planning
Standard difficulty
Evaluating Controllability filters
Relative evaluation
Rewarding Team-based rewards
Preset pay
Organizing, Environmental uncertainty is a
key determinant of how a firm is organized
because it affects the extent to which employees
possess knowledge about the environment and
how to transform inputs into outputs (Gordon&
Narayanan, 1984; Govindarajan, 1984; Khand-
walla, 1972; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thomp-
son, 1967). Hierarchy beigbt is the number of
vertical layers into which the organization is
structured ( Bruns & Waterhouse, 1.975; Otley,
1980; Rockness & Shields, 1984). Centraliza-
tion is the extent to which decision-making
authority is retained at higher levels in the
hierarchy (Bruns & Waterhouse, 1975; Merchant,
1981 ). Horizontal interdependency is the
nature and extent of horizontal resource and
information flows among individual employees
and/or organizational subunits in discharging
their responsibilities (Chenhall & Morris, 1986;
Chow et al, 199 lb; Hayes, 1977; Macintosh &
Daft, 1987). Finally, f~l rules are used by
many organizations to establish responsibility
for, and the methods of, accomplishing work-
related activities (Bruns & Waterhouse, 1975;
Merchant, 1985; Rockness & Shields, 1984;
Waterhouse & Tiessen, 1978).
Planning. Top-down planning is the extent
to which employees at lower hierarchical levels
are allowed to have input into the development
and selection of the plan which they will be held
responsible for achieving (Birnberg et aZ., 1990;
Shields & Young, 1993), Standard diflcuhy is
the ex ante probability that an employee can
attain his or her performance plan (Birnberg et
aL, 1990; Chow, 1983; Merchant & Manzoni,
1989).
Evaluating. A contmllabili~pkr adjusts for
or eliminates the effects of uncontrollable
factors fkom an employee’s performance app
4 The argument can be made that other components of control systems ( e.g. subjective vs objective performance evacuation,
long-term w short-term compensation) also are appropriate for inclusion. The current state of the literature is not sufficiently
developed to guide the prioritization of specific control system components for inclusion. While we acknowledge that
our list of components can be expanded, we maintain that our current tist stilt captures many important aspects of
management control systems in general. We decided to limit the number of control components because one of our
experiments involved choosing the levels of all the control system components, and prior research has found that a person
can simultaneously hold and process in working (i.e. short-term) memory only a limited number of information items
(Bimberg & Shields, 1984).
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raisals ( Demski, 1976; Merchant, 1989). Re[a -
tive evaluation is a speciftc controllability filter
whereby an employee’s measured performance
is evaluated against that of others who faced
similar uncertainty (Janakiraman et aL, 1992;
Maher, 1987).
Rewarding. Team -based reward is the degree
to which an employee’s rewards are determined
by his or her own performance as opposed
to that of a team of employees (Chow et al.,
199 1a, b). Preset pay is periodic pay which is
predetermined and not afTected by the current
period’s measured performance ( Demski &
Feltham, 1978; Wailer & Chow, 1985).
Complications in predicting tbe effects of
national culture on prefwences for
munagernent control components
Three complications arise in analyzing the
effects of national culture on preferences for
specific control components. First is that for any
individual, the four cultural dimensions are
operating simultaneously (Hofktede, 1980, 1991).
Hence, the (net ) preference for any particular
control component may be subject to the
mutually reinforcing or opposing effects of
diHerent cultural dimensions.
The second complication is that, in practice,
the various control system components operate
simultaneously and can act as substitutes or
complements for one another (Chow et al.,
199 la; Merchant, 1985; Otley, 1980; Rockness
& Shields, 1984). Art example of controls acting
as substitutes is that an organization can shield
employees’ rewards from environmental uncert-
ainty by using either controllability lilters or
a higher proportion of preset pay. An example
of complements is a greater use of team-
based rewards when interdependency among
employees or organizational subunits is high.
Third, the operation of a management control
system may involve trade-ofi across both
control components and objectives. An example
of the former is an organization seeking to
motivate its employees with a higher proportion
of performance-contingent pay. A side-effect of
this approach is increased employee exposure
to environmental uncertainty, which may gene-
rate demands for higher expcted pay as well
as eliorts to secure easier performance standards.
An example of trade-offs among objectives is the
use of individual-based rewards. While such
rewards can increase employees’ work effort,
they also can reduce the incentives for co-
operative behavior.
Because of these three complications, in
general, either the design of art organization’s
management controls or a potential emplo yee’s
selection of management controls is more likely
to require the simultaneous design of, or choice
from, a set of controls, rather than a series of
sequential and unrelated designs or choices.
However, there do exist decisions which only
involve specific management control compo-
nents, h example is a firm considering modi@ing
a particular aspect of its existing system, or a
labor market participant evaluating two compet-
ing control packages which are substantially
equal in other aspects. In such cases, ceteris
paribus predictions of univariate differences in
preferences may be feasible. The feasibility
would depend on whether the control compo-
nent in question is subject to the influence of
only one, or more than one, cultural dimension
and, in the latter case, whether the relevant
cultural dimensions are reinforcing or opposing 5
If the 11 control components are considered
individually, then the prior theoretical and
empirical literatures do provide some guidance
for predicting how Japanese and Americans’
preferences for them would di.fTer.Below, these
prior literatures are used to derive directional
predictions for eight of the 11 control system
components. We are unable to derive unam-
biguous directional predictions for the remain-
ing three components. Each of these is subject
to the potentially conflicting influences of
multiple cultural dimensions, and there is
insufficient guidance ffom the extent literature
to resolve these ambiguities. Table 2 summarizes
5 Given the potential for interdependencies among controls, such univariate predictions would necessarily be conditional
on the current levels of the other controls.
f
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TABLE 2. Univariate predictions of relative preferences for
control system components
Control system Operative Predicted
function nationat culture direction
I component dimension(s)
Organidng
Environmental
uncertainty
Hierarchy height
Centralization
Horizontal
interdependency
Format rules
Plaztning
Topdown planning
Standard
difficulty
Evacuating
Controllability
filters
Relative
evaluation
Rewarding
Team-based
rewards
Preset pay
Uncertainty avoidance
Power distance
Power distance
Individualism
Uncertainty avoidance
Power distance
Uncertainty avoidance
Masculinity
Uncertainty avoidance
Uncertainty avoidance
Individuahsm
Individualism
Masculinity
Individualism
Uncertainty avoidance
U.S. > Japan
Japan > U.S.
Japan > U.S.
Japan > U.S.
Japan > U.S.
Japan > U.S.
U.S. >Japan
Japan > U.S.
Japan > U.S.
Japan > U.S.
U.S. >Japan
Japan > U.S.
U.S. > Japan
Japan > U.S.
Japan > U.S.
the directional predictions lbr the control system
components. Each component is Iabeiled such that
a higher value denotes a higher preference for it.
Organizing. Because of their higher uncert-
ainty avoidance, the Japanese are predicted to
have a lower preference for environmental
uncertainty. The Japanese are predicted to have
a higher preference for greater hierarclry beigbt
owing to their higher power distance: a taller
hierarchy is a means of visibly establishing
seniority relationships and power or status
di.fTerentiais.GThe higher power distance of the
Japanese also is predicted to produce a higher
preference for centralization because this
would be consistent with power differentials in
which individuals higher in the hierarchy would
direct those below.’ In contrast, Americans are
predicted to prefer decentralization as a con-
sequence of their lower power distance.a
The preference for, or at least acceptance of,
Mrizontal interdependenqv is predicted to be
higher among the Japanese because of their
lower individualism (i.e. higher collectivism ).
Since formal rules (e.g. standard operating
procedures, policy manuals) provide guidance
on how to operate in uncertain situations, the
Japanese are predicted to have a higher prefer-
ence for them owing to their higher uncertainty
avoidance.9
Planning. The higher power distance of the
Japanese leads to the prediction that they would
have a higher preference for top-down piann-
fng (i.e. imposed budgets). 10 However, we are
unable to make a directional prediction for
standizrd di~culty because of the conflicting
influences of two cultural dimensions. The
higher uncertainty avoidance of the Japanese
would imply a higher preference for easier
standards since they are more likely to be
6 This prediction is consistent with the analysis of Lincoln et al ( 1986) and Lincotn & McBride ( 1987). These prior studies
suggested two major reasons why Japanese ftrms have more vertical layers. First, to accommodate their practice of long-
term employment, they need more vertical tayers to provide more opportunities for advancement. Second, more vertical
layers makes it easier to clearly specify superior-subordinate roles.
7 Lincoln et aL ( 1986) and Lincotn & McBride ( 1987) also predict that relative to U.S. tirrns, Japanese firms would have
higher centralization. However, they distinguish between two types of centralization: formal and de facto. Our analysis
focuses on de facto centralization.
s [tisof interest to note that flaky et al ( 1985) also predicted tha~ relative to the Japanese, the Americans would prefer
decentralization (purchase autonomy), but th~ empirical results indicated the opposite.
9 This prediction is consistent with the Iirtdingby Lincoln et d ( 1986) and Lincoln & McBride ( 1987) that formalization
is higher in Japanese than in U.S. tirtns.
10This prediction is contrary to the expectation of Da@ et af (1985), though it is consistent with their reported result.
It also is of interest that even though this directional prediction is a directimplication of Hofstede’s ( 1980) theory, an
opposite prediction is implied by other literature on Japanese management (e.g Ouchi, 1981; Pucik & Hatvany, 1983).
While resolving this contlict is an important research topic, it is beyond the scope of the current study.
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achieved. However, the higher masculinity of
the Japanese would imply that they would have
a higher preference for more challenging
standards. 11
Evaluating. The Japanese are predicted to
have a higher preference for contm[[ability
JHtersdue to their higher uncertainty avoidance. 12
We are unable to derive a directional prediction
regarding preferences for relative performance
evaluation. To the extent that relative evalua-
tion is a type of controllability filter, the Japanese
can be expected to have a higher preference for
it. However, relative evaluation also involves
interpersonal comparisons and overt competi-
tion. This would be inconsistent with the
preference of high-collectivism individuals to
avoid interpersonal competition and to preserve
interpersonal harmony.
Rewarding. The Japanese are predicted to
have a higher preference for t%am-h.sed rewards
owing to their more collective culture. However,
the Japanese and Americans’ relative prefer-
ences for preset pay are subject to the potential
influences of three cultural dimensions. While
the higher masculinity of the Japanese would
suggest a higher preference for proportionally
more monetary rewards tied to performance,
such rewards tend to introduce or accentuate
pay differences across co-workers, which is
inconsistent with high-collectivism cultures’
preferences for relatively equaI pay (Bond et aL,
1982 ). Another potentially relevant cultural
dimension is uncertainty avoidance. The Japanese’
higher score on this cultural dimension would
suggest a higher preference for preset pay to
reduce pay uncertainty due to uncontrollable
influences on performance.13
Hypotheses
This subsection presents four hypotheses for
empirical testing. Each of the first three hypo-
theses focuses on a single control component.
This univariate focus was aimed at avoiding
the ambiguities arising out of the interrelation-
ships among control components and the
potentially conflicting influences of multiple
cultural dimensions. The fourth hypothesis
addresses the preference for a set of controls
which are subject to the influence of all four
cultural dimensions.
Three features of the univariate hypotheses
should be noted. First is that they are a subset
of the eight directional predictions developed
in the preceding subsection. The decision to
include only three of these predictions was
based on two considerations. One was to keep
the time requirement of the experimental
session horn becoming excessive horn the
subjects’ perspective. The second was to focus
on these components of control systems which
have relatively greater accounting content.
Second, to ensure broad coverage of both
control functions and cultural dimensions, each
of the three control system components came
horn a different control function (planning,
evaluating and rewarding). Each of these control
components also relates to a different cultural
dimension (uncertainty avoidance, power dist-
ance and individualism ). In the preceding
subsection, these three dimensions had pro-
vided the basis for directional predictions
regarding individual control system components
(Table 2). The fourth dimension, masculinity, was
excluded because it was not associated with any
unambiguous directional prediction.
Third, each of these three control system
components was paired with a component of
the remaining control function (organizing)
which is related to the same cultural dimension.
The organizing component paired with each
control system component was one which we
expected to affect the importance of the latter.
Table 3 shows the three pairings of organizing
components and control components. In addition,
1I Re~~g to ~ con~ol system componenq DZIeyet UL( 1985) predicted, but obtained contrary resuk$ tiat U.S.subjec~
would agree more with having slack in budgets.
Iz ~s pr~ction is Comistent with Daley et UL’s ( 1985) results but not their stated eYtpeCUtiOn.
13In con-t to our lack of ~ d~ectio~ prediction, ~ey et a~ ( 1985) hypothesized md found that U.S. subjects agreed
more than did the Japanese subjects with using budget-based compensation.
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Fig. 1. Univariate predictions
it shows their common cultural dimension
which is used as a basis for developing an
hypothesis about the preference for each
pairingForexample, environmental uncertainty
was paired with the use and non-use of
controllability filters. Both are associated with
theculturaldimension ofuncertaintyavoidance,
and the uncertainty reduction effect of a
controllability filter is expected to increase with
the level of environmental uncertainty. Inclu-
sion of the organizing component in this manner
is based on the contingency theory perspective
that how a firm is organized provides the context
andor structure in which the planning, evaluat-
ing and rewarding control system components
are designed and operated, and hence employees’
reactions to, and preferences for, them (Birnberg
et aL, 1990; Kren & Liao, 1988; Merchant &
Simons, 1986). Thus, we expect that the level
of the organizing component would tiect the
extent to which culture-based preferences
would difTer for the paired control component.
Each of the Jirst three hypotheses (see below)
predicts an ordinal interaction efict between
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TABLE 3. Independent and dependent variables of the
univariate hypotheses
Dependent variable Independent variables
Control system organizing Cultural dimension
component comtwnent
Hypothesis I
Controllability Environmental Uncertainty
filters uncertainty avoidance
Hypothesis 2
Top-down planning Centralization Power distance
Hypothesis 3
Team-based rewards Horizontal Individualism
interdependency
an organizing component and national culture
on the preference for a control system compo-
nent. The form of each interaction is graphed
in Panels A, B and C of Fig. 1.
First consider uncertainty avoidance. The
Japanese have a higher score on this cultural
dimension than do the Americans. Based on the
preceding discussion, we predict that for any
level of environmental uncertainty, the Japanese
would have a higher preference for control-
lability filters than would the Americans (Tables
2 and 3). Further, since the level of environ-
mental uncertainty increases the uncertainty
reduction effect of controllability filters, we
predict that the difference betsveen Japanese
and U.S. preferences for controllability titers
would increase with the level of environmental
uncertainty:
H1. Japanese and AMerican preference for controll-
ability filters is an ordinat interaction of e!lviro~enti
uncertainty and nationat culture.
Considering power distance, the Japanese’
higher score on this dimension leads to the
prediction that they would have a higher
preference than would the Americans for top-
down, as opposed to participative, planning.
This difference is predicted to hold across levels
of centralization and to be a positive function
of it:
H2. Japanese and American preference for top-down
planning is art ordinal interaction of centralization and
national culture.
Relating to individualism, we predict that,
because the Japanese are lower on this cultural
dimension, they would have a higher preference
for team-based rewards than would the Amer-
icans. We also predict that this difference
would increase with the level of horizontal
interdependency:
H3. Japanese and American preference for team-based
rewards is an ordinal interaction of horizontal inter-
dependency and nationat culture.
Finally, to address the choice of a set of
controls, we had noted the lack of extant
evidence on both the interrelationships among
control components and the relative effect of
each cultural dimension on the preference for
each component (Table 2). Thus, we are only
able to predict that the Japanese and Americans
would have dtierent preferences for the set of
11 control system components:
H4. Japanese and American preference for a set of
control components is a thnction of national culture.
EMPIRICAL METHOD
Experimental design
All subjects participated in four independent
experiments. Each experiment focused on a
separate hypothesis.
Each of the first three experiments had a 2 X
2 besveen-subjects design. The dependent
variable in each experiment was the subject’s
stated preference for a particular control system
component. A two-level, bemveen-subjects vari-
able included in each experiment was national
culture (Japan vs the U.S.). The other two-level,
between-subjects variable in each experiment
was the organizing component paired to the
particular control system component for which
the subject was asked to indicate his or her
degree of preference.
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TABLE 4. Preference for controllability fitters”
Environmental Japan US
uncertainty
High
Cell mean 126.1 115,0
S.D. 48,6 49.0
No. observations 23 30 “
Low
CeU mean 113.1 102.8
S.D. 44.2 44.6
No. observations 14 24
l O = Strong preference fix no controlkabi.lity falters; 100 =
intierence; 200 = strong preference for controllability
iilters.
TABLE 5. Preference for top-down planning”
Centralization Japan Us.
High
Celf mean 65.6 61.1
S.D. 34.7 18.4
No. observations 18 22
Low
Celt mean 75.9 59.1
S.D. 30.4 33.3
No. observations 20 32
“ O = Strong preference for participative planning 100 =
indifference; 200 = strong preference kx top-down
planning.
between mtional culture and centralization was
not significant (p = O.34) in a 2 by 2 ANOVA.
The main effect for national culture was
marginally significant (p = O.10) while the main
effect for centralization was not significant (p =
0.52). Table 5 shows that, consistent with the
prediction, the Japanese subjects’ mean prefer-
ence for top-down planning exceeded that of
the U.S. subjects in both the high and low
centralization conditions. However, only the
difference in the low centralization case was
statistically significant (t = 1.87, p <0.05, one-
tailed test ). Also, the form of the ordinal
interaction was contrary to the prediction. The
difference in preference between the Japanese
and U.S. subjeets decreased (instead of increased)
as centralization increased (mean = 16.6 for low
centralization and 4.5 for high centralization).
Thus, these results do not support H2.
Test of I-2.3. H3 predicted that Japanese
subjects would have a higher preference for
TABLE 6, Preference for team-based rewards”
Horizontal Japan us.
interdependency
High
Cell mean 102,5 115.1
SD. 46.6 45.5
No. observations 16 30
Low
Cell mean 95.4 73.7
S.D. 41.2 41.7
No. observations 20 24
“ O = Strong preference for individual-based rewards; 100=
intierence 200 = strong preference for teatmbased
rewards,
team-based rewards under both low and high
horizontal interdependency, and that the mean
dfierence benveen Japanese and U.S. subjects
would increase with interdependency (Fig. 1,
Panel C), There was a marginally significant (p
= 0.07) interaction between national culture
and horizontal interdependency in a 2 by 2
ANOVA. However, its form was contrary to that
predicted. When horizontal interdependency
was low, the Japanese subjects had a significantly
(t = 1.75, p = 0.04, one-tailed test ) higher
preference for team-based rewards (mean =
95.4 VS 73.1) than did the U.S. subjects (Table
5). But when interdependency was high, the
U.S. subjects had a non-significantly (p = 0,19)
higher preference fir team-based rewards (mean
= 115,1 vs 102.5). Finally, while both subject
groups’ preference for team-based rewards
increased with horizontal interdependency, this
significant (p = 0.01) main effect should be
cautiously interpreted because of the presence
of the significant interaction effect. Thus, H3 was
not supported.
Test of H4. H4 predicted that Japanese and
U.S. samples would have diflerent preferences
for the set of 11 control system components.
Table 7 presents the mean values for the
Japanese and U.S. subjects’ preferences for these
components.
A 2 by 11 WOVA was used to test the
significance of these ditTerences in means. The
between-subjects factor was a two-level variable
for national culture, and the within-subject
variable had 11 levels for the control system
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TABLE 7. Cell meansandstandard deviations of stated preferences”
Variable Japan Us.
,Mean S.D. ,Mean S.D. t P
Environmental uncertainty 6,38 1.77 6.09 1.87 0.56 0.58
Hierarchy height 3.46 0.97 3.57 1.27 0.58 0,56
Centralization 3.10 1.6o 3,30 2,20 0.37 0,71
Horizontal interdependency 4.82 1.76 5.24 2.12 0.80 0.43
Format rules 6.18 1.83 4,28 1.89 4.78 0.01
Top-down planning 3.39 1.76 2.98 1.90 1.06 0.29
Standard difficulty 5.36 1.83 4.83 1.80 1.16 0.25
Controllability filters 6.95 1,69 6.48 2.70 0.91 0.37
Relative evaluation 5.21 2,12 5.87 2.10 1.44 0.15
Team-based rewards 5.69 2.43 5.04 2.54 1.34 0.18
Preset pay 6.1o 1.89 5.% 2.24 0.11 0.91
“ O = Extremely low preference, and 10 = extremely high preference.
Number of observations: Japan, 39; U.S., 54.
components. The main effect for national
culture was not significant (F = 0.52, p = 0.47).
Both the control system components main effect
and the interaction between these components
and national culture were highly significant
(respectively, F = 31.00, 3.35; p = 0.000,
0.00 1). The significant interaction indicated that
the Japanese artd U.S. subjects had made
systematically di.tTerent choices among the 11
control system components. To investigate
which of the 11 controls were differentially
preferred by the two groups, a t-test was
performed on each one. As shown in Table 7,
only one of the 11 tests indicated a significant
difference: for formal rules, the Japanese had a
higher preference than did the U.S.
sample (means = 6.18, 4.28; t = 4.78, P <
0.01 ).17 Overall, these results provided support
for H4.
DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
Understanding how cultural d~erences aiTect
individuals’ preferences for, and reactions to,
management controls is both an important and
challenging issue. Prior research has either used
cultural theories to empirically examine aggre-
gated functions of a control system (e.g.
monitoring, evaluating) or empirically exam-
ined specific controls (e.g. standard tightness,
participation) without using cultural theories as
a basis for predicting or interpreting the results.
This study has tried to adopt the strengths of
each previous approach by using Hofktede’s
(1980, 1991 ) taxonomy of work-related cultural
dimensions to guide an experimental investiga-
tion of preferences for specific management
controls.
A major departure of this study from prior
]-To gain insights into the subjects’ groupings of the 11 control components, we factor-analyzed their vectors of stated
preferences. A varimax rotation identified five orthogonal hctors with eigenvalues above 1.0. Together, these factors
explained 62% of the total variance. Using a loading criterion of I 0.50 I , every control component loaded on a single
factor. This result suggested that the subjects viewed the 11 control components as comprising distinct subsets. However,
we were unable to interpret the five factors, owing to the disparate nature of their constituent components. This finding
suggests that the interrelationships among control components and the effects of the four cukuraf dimensions are highly
complex. We also used each subject’s five factor scores as the dependent variable in a 2 X 5 MANOVA,with national
culture as the two-level between-subjects independent variable, and control f%ctoras the five-level within-subjects variable.
Consistent with the expectation of a difference between Japanese and U.S. subjects’ preferences, the factor score by
nationaf culture interaction was significant @ = 0.002). A t-test on each factor indicated that only the means for one of
the factors were significantly different between the two samples (p = 0.002).
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research is the focus on the interface between
the organization and the external labor market.
It is suggested that the fit between an organiza-
tion’s control and national culture can aifect
more than the job-related actions of a given set
of employees. Rather, it also may tiect the costs
of attracting employees and the job-related
characteristics of the employees attracted to the
organization.
The results of the first three experiments
provided, at best, very weak support for the
three univariate hypotheses. Each of these
experiments tested a theory-based hypothesis
about how national culture and an organizational
context or structure variable interactively tiect
an individual’s preference for a management
control. In contrast, the results of the fourth
experiment provided support fir the multivariate
hypothesis.
Many potential explanations exist for this
study’s findings. Addressing the validity and
relative impacts of these explanations presents
fruitful directions for fiture research. Consider
first the results of testing the three univariate
hypotheses. One reason for the unexpected
findings is that some of the cultural dimensions
may not have had strong effects on preferences.
For example, Hofstede ( 1991) has suggested
that the uncertainty avoidance dimension may
not be a universally applicable construct. This
could have explained the lack of support for the
predictions regarding preferences for controll-
ability lilters. Hofktede ( 1991) presents evid-
ence that a new dimension, called Cofician
dynamism (or long-term vs short-term orienta-
tion in life), has recently been empirically found
in studies using Western and/or Eastern samples.
Perhaps this dimension could explain an indivi-
dual’s preference for budgeting, performance
measurement and rewards which cover difFerent
lengths of time.
Alternatively, the cultural dimensions may
be important determinants of preferences for
mamgement controls, but the Japanese and U.S.
samples did not diverge enough on these
dimensions to provide sufficiently strong tests
of the predictions. For example, both national
cultures have scores on power distance in the
middle range of Hol%tede’s 100-point index ( 54,
40). On each of the other three dimensions, one
national culture has a high score ( > 90) and
the other culture has a score in the middle range
of the index (46, 46, 62). We had selected the
Japanese and U.S. cultures for study because of
their important roles in the global economy.
While their cultures did differ on Hot%tede’s
dimensions, ex post, these differences may not
have been extreme enough to provide sufK-
ciently powerful tests. Future research could
provide more powefil tests of hypotheses by
selecting national cultures which are more
divergent than the two used in this study.
Similarly, the experiment may have been
limited by the degree to which extreme
manipulations of the organizational context or
structure variables had been used. While the
manipulation checks supported the success of
inducing low and high levels of each treatment,
more extreme levels of each treatment may have
provided more powerful tests of the predicted
effects<
At the multivariate level of choosing multiple
control components, a limitation of the current
study is that it did not examine how cultural
d~erences tiect preferences for subsets of
controls. This limitation was due to the absence
of extant theoretical and empirical literatures
on the complementary and substitute relation-
ships among controls, as well as the relative
effects of difFerent cultural dimensions on the
preference for a particular control. Because of
this lack of guidance from the extant literature,
we could only predict a difference between the
Japanese and U.S. samples, but we had very
limited ability to explain the significant differe-
nce that was found. Hence, an important
implication of this study is the need for
theoretical and empirical research to identify
how preference structures for management
controls are affected by national culture.
One way to further refine theoretical develop-
ment in the area is by means of empirical
research which integrates two related activities.
One is to use multivariate preference scaling
and estimation methods (e.g. multidimensional
scaling conjoint analysis, LINMAP, PREFMAP) to I
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develop multidimensional representations (i.e.
“mental models” ) of individuals’ preferences for
sets of management controls. By itself, this
research activity could provide inductive evid-
ence on how individuals view control system
components as being independent, substitutes,
or complements.
The second research activity is to construct
such representations for individuals from di.fTer-
ent national cultures to test how variation in
national culture is associated with variation in
these representations. For example, to isolate
the effects of each of Hofktede’s four cultural
dimensions on such preference representations,
one could dichotomize each cultural dimension
(e.g. low, high) and gather data from 16
countries ( = 24) which occupy these 16 cells
of a factorial design.
More focused studies also are possible by
selecting a set of nations that are similar on some
cultural dimensions but not on others. For
example, Hofstede’s ( 1980, 1991 ) results indi-
cate that Norway and Sweden have about equal
scores on three of the four cultural dimensions
(power distance, individualism and masculinity).
Thus, a comparison of the preference represent-
ations between samples from these two nations
can be used to stt,tciy the effects of uncertainty
avoidance.
ln closing, this experimental study has pre-
sented evidence that some differences exist
between Japanese and American preferences for
controls at the organization+xternal labor
market interface. Many of the observed differ-
ences, however, were inconsistent with predic-
tions based on Hofstede’s ( 1980, 1991) model.
As such, the findings of this study suggest that
the relationship between management control
preferences and national culture is complex and
probably influenced by many variables. Much
opportunity exists for additional research on
this important and interesting topic.
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